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ABSTRACT
Recent diversification activities of major companies in
the petroleum industry are studied to determine if value has
been created for the companies' shareholders as a result of
these activities. Contemporary methods in financial economics
are employed to calculate the firms' all equity excess returns
for each year in the analysis period. These are related to the
firms' diversification strategies (represented by changes in
revenue sources and company structure) via a hypothesis testing
technique utilizing cross-classification tables.
As a result of testing several hypotheses, it is concluded
that diversification has had no significant effect on the equity
returns of the oil companies. Several widely criticized acqui-
sitions have not adversely affected the firms' stockholders,
as generally believed. The much greater size of oil-related
revenues compared to non-oil revenues is deemed responsible.
The oil companies may continue similar acquisitions and expect
relative impunity in the market. Diversification, however,
should still satisfy certain strategic and economic criteria
and not lead to serious repercussions from the public and
private sector.
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I. Introduction
During the past 30 years, an increasing proportion of U.S.
companies have seen wisdom in pursuing a strategy of diversifi-
cation. Between 1950 and 1970, for example, single-business com-
panies comprising the Fortune 500 declined from 30% to 8% of the
total. Among these diversifying companies are many of the
major oil companies who, for several reasons including their
size, wealth, and high visibility, have attracted attention to
their diversification activities. It is these activities and
their resultant effects on the value of twelve of the major oil
companies which is of primary concern here.
Corporate diversification can occur via acquisition or in-
ternal development. The former is the more efficient of the
two for large corporations because it can be carried out more
swiftly and does not require the internal reorganization ac-
companying the latter. For the companies in this study, diversi-
fication has primarily occurred through acquisition, but this
is not important because subsequent analyses for the effects
of diversification are not dependent on the manner in which
diversification was achieved.
The business literature discusses various types of possible
gains or economies to diversifying corporations. Among these
are operating gains, increased market power, and financial ef-
fects. It is generally assumed that these gains are only at-
tainable through related diversification, but they can also be
realized through unrelated diversification. A related-business
diversifier uses its skills in a specific functional activity
or product market as a basis for branching out. An unrelated-
business diversifier pursues growth in product markets where the
main success factors are unrelated to each other. Both can
create significant benefits for the corporation and its share-
holders.
Value is created for the shareholders of a diversifying
company when the diversification leads to increased returns on
equity at correspondingly reduced systematic risk. (Systematic
risk is that portion of total risk which cannot be reduced
through simple portfolio diversification.) Before any diversi-
fication activity is engaged in by a firm, it should be justi-
fied as an action of potential benefit to the shareholders of
the firm, considering all implications. It must increase the
market value of the company without creating serious reper-
cussions.
There are three principal methods of evaluating corporate
diversification. These involve use of the Strategy Model, the
Product/Market Portfolio Model, and the Risk/Return Model.
The Risk/Return Model is used in this study because of its
versatility in analyzing both related and unrelated diversi-
fication, its use of contemporary concepts in financial econo-
mics (and, therefore, its use of quantitative methods), and the
availability of data necessary for the model. The financial
orientation of the Risk/Return Model tells managers that diver-
sification decisions should be evaluated as investment deci-
sions. The same model can be used to evaluate these decisions
once they have been implemented.
The twelve major oil companies chosen for this study are:
The Atlantic Richfield Company; Exxon Corporation; Gulf Oil
Corporation; Mobil Corporation; the Shell Oil Company; the
Standard Oil Companies of California, Indiana, and Ohio; Sun
Company, Inc.; Tenneco, Inc.; Texaco, Inc.; and the Union Oil
Company of California. These companies were selected primarily
for their individual and combined sizes, as reflected in their
total revenues. Each is a large, vertically-integrated, virtu-
ally single-industry firm (except for Tenneco) and their
combined revenues comprise the vast majority of revenues for
the entire energy industry. Any conclusions derived from an
analysis of these firms can reasonably be applied to the energy
industry as a whole and, perhaps, to other large firms that
dominate some other industry.
The firms are categorized in each year of the study period
according to their degree of diversification, which is deter-
mined by their distribution of sales in different revenue seg-
ments. These categorizations are analyzed for any relation to
the firms' excess returns on equity. The same is done by com-
paring the firms' actual participation in different revenue
segments to their excess returns. This two-sided approach to
the problem should clearly indicate a relation, if any, between
the firms' diversification strategies and their returns on
stock.
Excess returns on equity is used as the basis on which to
examine the effect of diversification because it reflects the
benefits or costs to the firms' stockholders of unanticipated
(by the market) activities of the firms during a specific time
period. Diversification is an example of such unanticipated
activity. The excess returns for each firm are calculated on
an annual basis from 1967 to 1981. This period of time and
the annual basis was chosen because it provides sufficient data
for the analysis to be statistically robust, includes the years
of greatest activity in the oil industry, and contains most
recent data which enables conclusions to be derived that more
accurately reflect possible future trends.
The methodology for relating excess returns to the firms'
diversification activities involves the use of cross-classifica-
tion tables and a hypothesis testing technique which measures
the success of a hypothesis by its superiority over a chance
prediction. Through the testing of various hypotheses relating
diversification to excess returns on equity, it will be deter-
mined if diversification has created value for oil industry
shareholders. These results will also lead to a set of con-
clusions and recommendations that apply to major firms in the
energy industry and, perhaps, to dominant firms in some other
industry.
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II. An Overview of Corporate Diversification
General
The issues and literature on corporate diversification1
through merger, acquisition, and/or internal development are
voluminous but relatively straightforward. Major points on the
topic as they pertain to this study will be presented here to
provide a sufficient overview of the subject and an introduction
to subsequent sections.
There are many reasons and pressures leading companies to
diversify. Among these are to mitigate the effects of a slow
down in sales and earnings accompanying the mature phase of a
business' life cycle; to exploit new product ideas developed
through a successful R&D effort; to build on an existing fran-
chise; competitive pressure; to smooth the swings of cyclical
income streams; to more fully utilize the management skills of
executives within the diversifying company; to attract and re-
tain first-rate managers with new responsibilities and oppor-
tunities; and, U.S. antitrust laws which force growth oriented
companies to search for diversification opportunities in other
fields rather than use their money to expand either horizon-
tally or vertically.
Companies can diversify through acquisition or internal
development. Diversification through internal development re-
lies on existing internal resources to establish a new busi-
ness. Such a strategy of diversification requires an explicit
planning process and special technological and organizational
1. Refs. 2, 4-6, 8-13, 17, 24.
capacities that can take several years to implement and can lead
to major internal rearrangements. On the other hand, diversifi-
cation through acquisition can occur swiftly and does not require
sustained planning nor does it necessarily lead to disruptive
reorganization. Thus it can save a company time and can cost
less because of such factors as patents, product image, exclusive
distribution, and special management and/or research and develop-
ment skills which can be very difficult to emulate through in-
ternal development within reasonable time and costs.
For the large corporations in this study, diversification
into new businesses has logically occurred through acquisitions.
Diversification within the main business in the form of horizon-
tal and/or vertical integration has also occurred via acquisi-
tions, but to some extent through internal development. This
"how" aspect of the companies' diversification is not of con-
cern here. It is more a question of what areas the companies
have diversified into (and the resultant effects) that is at
issue.
Important Considerations
The most important question facing a company adopting a
strategy of diversification is: How can value be created for
the company's shareholders through diversification? Put in a
different way, how can shareholders' interests best be served
(assuming this is the primary goal of the firm's managers and
that shareholders' interests are being served in the first
13
place) now that the firm has adopted a diversification strategy?
Before considering these questions, it is important to point
out some misunderstandings about diversification as they relate
to the economics of this strategy and its successful implemen-
tation.
Acquisitive diversifying firms2 generate higher returns
through increased earnings and capital appreciation than
their counterparts.
(This idea gained support because acquisition companies
can sustain high levels of growth in earnings per share,
EPS, and, in the 1960's, the market considered this a good
indicator of management's performance and a business' econ-
omic strength. It became clear, however, that this high
EPS growth was merely accounting related and that capital
productivity was a better indicator. This led to a fall
in the market value of many acquisitive companies, implying
analysts' uncertainty about the size and variability of the
companies' future cash flows. The greater the uncertainty,
the higher the discount rates applied to a company's future
earnings and the less capital appreciation.)
Unrelated diversification by firms offers shareholders a
superior means of reducing their investment risk.
(Investment risk consists of company-specific unsystematic
risk, which can be diversified away, and systematic risk,
2. Arguments presented in this section for firms diversifying
through acquisitions are meant to apply equally to firms diver-
sifying through internal development.
which is common to all market securities and cannot be eli-
minated through diversification. Company unrelated diversi-
fication reduces unsystematic risk, but, since the investor
can do this for himself through portfolio diversification,
he need not have a company do it for him. In fact, invest-
ment in a mutual fund may be more attractive than invest-
ment in a diversified firm because of the firm's high man-
agement costs and its inability to move into or out of as-
sets as quickly as can be done with a mutual fund.)
* Adding countercyclical businesses to a company's port-
folio leads to stabilized earnings and thereby increased
market value.
(Even if diversifying companies can identify countercycli-
cal businesses, it is very difficult for them to construct
balanced portfolios of businesses whose variable returns
balance one another; and, if they could, the portfolios
would eventually need rebalancing since the businesses grow
at different rates. Also, the market may be more interested
in growth and the productivity of invested capital than in
earnings stability. Lastly, investors are unlikely to bid
up the values of diversified companies since the benefits
of stabilized income streams can simply be obtained through
portfolio diversification.)
Related diversification is safer than unrelated diversifi-
cation.
(Successful related diversification depends on both the
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quality of the acquired business and the organizational in-
tegration required to achieve the possible benefits of com-
panies exchanging their skills and resources, i.e. synergy.
Also, the businesses must be truly related and the merger must
lead to a competitive advantage. Otherwise, related diversi-
fication cannot be justified as even comparable to unrelated
diversification as a means of reducing risks or increasing
earnings.)
The benefits of diversification through acquisition will be
realized if the acquired company has a strong management team.
(This belief is why many companies try to limit their acquisi-
tion candidates to well-managed companies. But, whether pur-
suing related or unrelated diversification, the acquiring
company's management skills and resources are critical to
achieving the potential benefits of diversification, not the
acquired firm's. It is the acquirer who must exploit the
circumstances brought on by the transaction through effective
use of the acquired company's core skills and resources.)
Value can be created for the shareholders of a company pur-
suing diversification when the diversification leads to increased
returns (i.e., an income stream for the diversified company that
is greater than could be realized from a portfolio investment in
the original company and a similarly managed company in the "new"
business) and reduced systematic risk (that is, a reduction in
the variability of the income stream for the diversified company
greater than that which could be realized from a portfolio in-
16
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vestment as before). It is important to emphasize that most
benefits of reducing unsystematic risk through diversification
are as available to individual investors as they are to cor-
porate investors. Diversifying companies will not create value
for their shareholders by merely diversifying away unsystematic
risk. In efficient capital markets, unsystematic risk is irrele-
vant in equity valuation since investors can diversify away un-
systematic risk for themselves. Value can only be created for
shareholders when the diversified company's risk/return trade-
offs include benefits not available through simple portfolio
diversification.
The principal ways in which diversifying companies can ob-
tain returns 3 greater than those obtainable from simple portfolio
diversification are:
* By acquiring a firm whose management has certain skills and
industry knowledge that can be applied to the acquiring firm.
(This is the realization of synergy in the case of related
diversification. Management skills and resources critical
to the success of a business are reinforced in the original
firm by the merged partner, leading to higher profitability
and value for the firm's shareholders.)
* Through investments in closely related markets that lead to
reduced long-run average costs.
(This related diversification can reduce average costs
through economies of scale, rationalization of produc-
tion and other managerial tasks, and technological innovation.)
3. Note: Returns and risk are directly related.
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* Through business expansion in a competent area that can lead
to the development of additional resources, which can be used
to develop abilities necessary to outperform the competition.
(In many industries, managers claim that companies must
achieve a certain size before they can compete effectively.
One of the ways of attaining this required size is by making
closely related, diversifying acquisitions.)
* By diversifying into related product markets which can en-
able a company to reduce systematic risks.
(Diversifying into a related product market can help a com-
pany reduce its technological, production, or marketing
risks. If these reduced business risks can be translated
into a less variable income stream for the firm, value is
created for the shareholders.)
* Through diversification which permits cash to be transferred
from units operating with a surplus to units operating with
a deficit, thereby reducing the need for individual busi-
nesses to obtain expensive working-capital funds from
outside sources.
(This is a case of unrelated diversification in which the
widely diversified company has the opportunity to balance
the working capital needs and surpluses of its divisions
as the economy experiences a business cycle or as the divi-
sions experience seasonal fluctuations. This type of work-
ing capital management is an operating benefit distinct
from the recycling of cash on an investment basis.)
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* Through diversification allowing the company to direct in-
vestment funds from high net cash flow businesses to pro-
jected high growth businesses whose current net cash flow
is zero or negative.
(This benefit of unrelated diversification can improve the
long-run profitability of the corporation as a whole. It
is a result of the U.S. tax code, which imposes double tax-
ation of dividends via corporate profits taxes and personal
income taxes. By reinvesting its surplus cash flow, the
company defers taxes the stockholders would otherwise have
to pay. Essentially, this is a case of cross-subsidization
which has important implications. Diversified companies
have access to information that is often unavailable to the
investment community. This "inside" information is inter-
nally generated market data about each industry in which
the company operates, and includes information about the
competitive position and potential of each company in the
industry. Thus, the diversified company can better assess
the investment merits of particular projects and industries
in which it is involved, enabling the company to choose
the most attractive projects. This leads to a more effici-
ent allocation of capital among the projects and industries
by the company than the capital market.)
Through unrelated diversification which pools risk and can
lower a company's cost of debt, allowing the company greater
leverage than a nondiversified equivalent firm.
(This reduces the company's total cost of capital because it
enables the shareholders to shift some risk to the government,
which shoulders part of the cost of debt capitalization in a
business venture by allowing tax deductions on debt interest.
This benefit can only be realized, however, if the firm
aggressively manages its financial risks by raising its
debt-equity ratio or by operating several high-risk, un-
related projects in its portfolio of businesses.)
An unrelated-business diversifier is a company pursuing
growth in product markets where the main success factors are
unrelated to one another. A related-business diversifier uses
its skills in a specific functional activity or product mar-
ket as a basis for branching out. In either case, diversifi-
cation does offer potentially significant benefits to the cor-
poration and its shareholders. When a company has the ability
to export or import surplus skills or resources useful in its
competitive environment, related diversification is an attrac-
tive strategy. When a company possesses the skills and re-
sources to analyze and manage widely different businesses,
unrelated diversification can be best. Lastly, when a company
possesses both of these abilities, the best strategy to adopt
depends on the personal skills and inclinations of the com-
pany's top managers.
A final point worth stressing concerns two major reasons
why programs of diversification fail. Both reasons are related
to a lack of comprehensive diversification plans by the diversi-
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fying company. The first is that companies often tend to ac-
quire firms that are available, rather than firms which meet
strategic and economic criteria. Thus, chances for failure
are high. Second, there is the danger of overpaying for an
acquisition that seems particularly attractive. No matter
how attractive an opportunity is or how well it fits a company's
needs, there is a price beyond which the venture is no longer
worth considering. By adhering to the strategic and economic
logic presented herein, these major errors (making the wrong
acquisition or paying too much for the right one) can be
avoided and the diversifying firm can improve its competitive
position and create value for its shareholders.
An Analytical Framework
There are three principal methods of determining whether
or not the diversification activities of a firm have been bene-
ficial to the firm and its stockholders; i.e., whether or not
these activities have created value for the firm's investors.
The first is well established and is known as the Strategy
Model. It focuses on the process of defining how a company
should compete in its economic environment and how its per-
formance can be measured. The model places heavy emphasis
4. Note: These methods are also applied in evaluating the bene-
fits of diversification before it is undertaken. They help
establish meaningful diversification guidelines and identify
high-potential acquisition candidates. The discussion here-
in of their use in an ex post evaluation of diversification
is more in line with the analytical rather than prescriptive
nature of this study on oil company diversification.
21
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on the concept of strategy, commonly defined as "the determination
of basic long-term goals of an enterprise and the adoption of
courses of action and the allocation or resources necessary
for carrying out these goals". The goal of the model is to
facilitate a rational choice among strategic options facing a
company. The options concern which opportunities to exploit,
which strengths to build on, which risks to defend against,
and what policies to pursue toward these ends. An option is
viewed in terms of how well it fits with the company's skills
and resources and the extent to which it furthers the attain-
ment of corporate goals and objectives. Thus, application of
the model favors closely related diversification. Any analy-
sis of diversification must include an assessment of whether
or not the area into which the firm has diversified is suffi-
ciently similar to have warranted the action. The model sug-
gests that only after a company's strengths and weaknesses
in each functional area have been identified is its management
in a position to evaluate the potential of diversification.
Finally, it says the best approach to diversification is not
to measure product-market attractiveness but to identify those
organization strengths that may be transferred to other pro-
duct markets and those weaknesses that need to be corrected.
Because of its emphasis on related diversification and its
qualitative evaluation process, the Strategy Model was not
used to examine the diversification activities of the companies
in this study.
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The second method of evaluation employs the Product/Mar-
ket Portfolio Model which, as the name implies,is concerned
with the composition and management of a company's product/mar-
ket portfolio. The model focuses on the strengths of a com-
pany's portfolio of products or businesses, where these
strengths are defined in terms of market share and market
growth. Emphasis is placed on the cash flow characteristics
of a business. The model states that a company should evalu-
ate the competitive situation and market growth within its
business units and construct a cluster of businesses through
which high cash flow can be achieved. The goal is to maxi-
mize the total strength of the company which, according to
the model, is best achieved by balancing sources and uses of
cash within the company. Diversification opportunities and
decisions are evaluated in terms of the cash flow patterns
they produce - how they evolve over time, the investment
required to generate them, and their fit with the cash flows
from existing products and businesses. Changes in the busi-
ness portfolio should fill financial weak spots or build upon
financial strengths.
The Product/Market Portfolio Model suggests guidelines
for both related and unrelated diversification and therefore
can be used to evaluate the benefits that construe from
either activity. Successful related diversification should
reduce relative costs or increase market share resulting
in higher cash flow and return on investment. Successful
23
unrelated diversification should improve a company's cash flow
balance by generating both investment funds and investment op-
portunities, leading to an improved financial and strategic
position.
This model does not provide a satisfactory basis for com-
paring diversification strategies with similar product/market
or cash use/cash generation characteristics, nor is it help-
ful in defining when the costs of further investment in a busi-
ness outweigh the potential cash flow benefits. Neither the
Strategy nor the Product/Market Portfolio Models can handle
these issues. In light of these shortcomings, which are not
present in the third model, and because of the difficulty in
obtaining data on cash flows from the various businesses into
which the sample companies have diversified, the Product/Mar-
ket Portfolio Model was rejected as a means of analyzing di-
versification effects in this study.
The third method of diversification analysis involves the
Risk/Return Model. This model was chosen for this study be-
cause of its use of contemporary concepts in financial econ-
omics. In contrast to the Strategy and Product/Market Port-
folio Models, the Risk/Return Model reflects the interests of
investors rather than managers. It leads managers to view
their company as a portfolio of investments in capital as-
sets by investors through the company's securities, and helps
them construct an investment portfolio that creates real
economic value for investors. This model can readily be ap-
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plied in an analysis of corporate strategy, particularly in
diversification. It helps assess the effect of diversification
on the market value of a company.
In the Risk/Return Model, diversification analysis is
accomplished through use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM)5 expresses algebraically as:
E(Ri) = E(Rf) + i(E(Rm) - E(Rf))
where Ri is the investment's risk adjusted rate of return, Rf
is the risk-free rate, ýi is the systematic risk level of the
security, and Rm is the rate of return on the market portfolio.
E( ) denotes expected value6
For the purposes of this study, Ri is the annual rate of
return on a company's stock. Rf is the annual rate of return
on U.S. Treasury Bills, which are assumed risk-free since they
have the lowest probability of default and are the most liquid
of all instruments in the capital market. Rm- Rf is the
difference between the annual rates of return earned by owning
the risky market portfolio and owning the risk-free asset and,
therefore, constitutes the market's risk premium. In theory,
the market portfolio should include all risky assets, but,
in practice and for this study, it is limited to stocks com-
5. For details on the development and applications of CAPM,
see ref. 4.
6. Though CAPM is generally used in a predictive capacity, it
can be used in an ex post analysis of returns, as is done
in this study. In that case, expected values become real-
ized (actual) values. This is of no consequence for Rf,
however, since the realized value of Rf is the same
as E(Rf).
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prising the Standard and Poor's 500. 1i (beta) is obtained
by regressing the company's historical (previous 5 years) re-
turns on stock against corresponding market returns. Thus, it
measures the security's systematic risk which is of interest
to investors because unsystematic risk can be eliminated through
simple portfolio diversification. A beta less than 1.0 in-
dicates the security's returns are less variable than the
market's returns and therefore less risky. The opposite is
true for a security with a beta greater than 1.0. Despite the
fact that beta reflects historical relationships, it is use-
ful for short-term (annual) forecasts because most assets'risk
profiles have been shown to change slowly over time.
The financial orientation of the Risk/Return Model tells
managers that diversification decisions must be evaluated as
investment decisions via CAPM. The key issues to be considered
prior to diversification are: What is the E(Ri) associated with
this decision? Does the decision have a positive net present
value (equal to the sum of associated discounted cash flows
less the initial investment)? What is the net effect of the
decision on the market value of the company? Analogous ques-
tions can be considered after diversification. The point is
that diversification decisions should meet at least one of the
following conditions: either they should (1) reduce the level
of systematic risk below that of a comparable portfolio of
securities without reducing expected returns, or (2) increase
returns above those of a comparable portfolio without increas-
26
ing systematic risk.
According to the Risk/Return Model, reduced systematic risk
can be achieved by the diversifying company when:
1. Related diversification reduces the variability of a
business's cash flow by increasing the size of the com-
pany such that it becomes the low cost producer or the
dominant competitor within a business.
2. More effective project selection by the diversified com-
pany generates a faster growing or more stable cash flow
than available in a comparable portfolio of businesses.
3. Diversification enables management to adopt high business
risk strategies for individual businesses that have or
lead to low systematic risk. (Less diversified companies
would be less willing to employ such strategies because
of their potentially high costs.)
Likewise, increased returns can be achieved by the diversify-
ing company when:
1. Related diversification leads to more effective utiliza-
tion of the company's key skills and resources, thereby
reducing average costs.
2. Unrelated diversification creates a larger set of in-
vestment opportunities within the company, from which
a greater proportion of high return projects are selected.
3. Aggressive financial management within the diversified
company improves working-capital management and increases
the firm's debt level.
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These guidelines suggest that the benefits of corporate
diversification are more limited than commonly perceived. Never-
theless, the Risk/Return Model suggests that a well-managed
diversified firm can provide value for its investors through
a more stable, better managed cash flow that ultimately leads
to increased returns and/or reduced systematic risk which may
not be attained through a comparable portfolio of securities;
i.e., the diversified firm can have a greater net present value
than the comparable portfolio.
Details on the application of the Risk/Return Model
(and CAPM) in this study are presented in Section IV.
28
III. Company Data and Issues
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Company Data
The companies chosen for this study are twelve of the lar-
gest firms in the energy industry. Their total revenues are all
in the multi-billions of dollars and, combined, their energy
revenues comprise the vast majority of revenues for the indus-
try as a whole. The companies were selected for their size
(each company is a large, upper level Fortune 500 corporation)
and their combined revenues (representing such a large portion
of the industry). Any conclusions that can be drawn from a
study involving these firms can reasonably be applied to other
large firms that dominate some other major industry.
The twelve-company sample is:
SAtlantic Richfield Company (ARCO)
SExxon Corporation (XON)
* Gulf Oil Corporation (GULF)
* Mobil Corporation (MOBIL)
* Shell Oil Company (SHELL)
*Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL)
* Standard Oil Company of Indiana (SOIND)
*Standard Oil Company of Ohio (SOHIO)
SSun Company, Inc. (SUN)
*Tenneco, Inc. (TENN)
*Texaco, Inc. (TEX)
SUnion Oil Company of California (UNION)
Appendix A contains a description of each company's cur-
rent business and a historical overview of the company's
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diversification and other activities from 1967 to 19811 This
period of time is sufficiently long in that it contains enough
data for a statistically robust study and has well within it
the events of recent great significance in the energy industry -
the oil price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979. This means the per-
iod contains much data that can be considered independent of
these occurrences and, since the period also contains most
recent data, a better judgement can be made concerning the
effects of future company activities. More reliable recommen-
dations for future actions can also be given.
Appendix B gives each company's annual total sales from
1967 to 1981 and then identifies the proportion of these sales
that came from particular segments. These segments are labeled
Energy I, Energy II, Non-Energy I, and Non-Energy II. The
businesses from which the revenues are derived in each of these
segments not only vary among the firms, but within each firm
through the years. Thus, the results of each firm's acquisitions
and divestments (along with its basic businesses) are reflected
in the firm's revenues.
In general, despite the inter-company differences, the re-
venues in each of the business segments are derived as follows:
Energy I - By far the largest segment for all companies
(except for Tenneco where Non-Energy II is just as large),
this segment contains oil and oil-related revenues that come
from oil exploration, production, transportation, refining,
1. Information obtained from ref. 21.
2. Compiled from ref. 23.
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and marketing. Revenues from petroleum products and natural
gas are also contained here because of their close relation-
ship with oil.
Energy II - Any revenues generated by non-oil energy-related
businesses are contained here. These can be through coal,
nuclear, synthetics, shale oil, tar sands, solar, geothermal,
and wind activities.
Non-Energy II - Revenues from any businesses that are not
related to oil or other energy operations are in this cate-
gory.
Appendix B more specifically describes the activities each
company has in the business segments and gives the periods of
time the company has been engaged in those activities. Appen-
dix B also identifies the structural category applicable to
each company in each year. This "structural category" is
based on Rumelt's work 3 in which he classified four types of
strategies of corporate diversification. These are the single
product business, dominant business, related product business,
and unrelated product business. All the companies in this study
(except for Tenneco which falls in the last category) come under
the dominant business category. In a dominant business, one
product accounts for 70 to 95% of the firm's total sales. In
an unrelated business organization, the firm has more than 30%
of its sales outside its main business, but these other busi-
nesses have little or no relation to each other.
Rumelt further elaborated on the dominant business category
3. Ref. 11.
by dividing it into four subcategories - dominant vertical (DV),
dominant constrained (DC), dominant linked (DL), and dominant
unrelated (DU). DV represents vertically integrated firms. The
company's other products are by-products of the dominant busi-
ness. DC, DL, and DU characterize the degree of relatedness of
the businesses into which the firm has diversified. A DC com-
pany's other products utilize the same technology or market
channel as the dominant business, but diversification is con-
strained by a desire to exploit a particular advantage. The
DL company's other businesses appear unrelated, but there are
links of varying types among them, such as a common technology
or a common distribution channel. A DU firm's businesses are
totally unrelated to the dominant business and other businesses.
All the oil companies in this study, except for Tenneco, fall
in one or more of these categories throughout the period from
1967-1981. (Tenneco is an Acquisitive Conglomerate, AC, through
this period. AC is a subcategory of the unrelated business
category. An AC company's businesses are totally unrelated and
there is no dominant business. The company is agressively en-
gaged in acquiring other firms.) The particular category in
each year for each company is indicated in Appendix B and sum-
marized for all companies in Appendix C.
The manner in which the structural categories were assigned
to each company is somewhat subjective, but this subjectivity
is modified through qualitative and quantitative measures.
Basically, the categories were decided upon by identifying the
businesses each company is engaged in through both its segmented
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sales information (Appendix B) and its history of acquisitions,
divestments, and other activities (Appendix A). Each company's
businesses, separate from its dominant business, were compared
to the dominant business and each other. Based on these compari-
sons, the appropriate structural category was assigned to each
company in a particular year; and, having done this for all
years, each company was categorized throughout the period.
Issues to Examine
The basic issues to be explored here are simple but very
important to both the managers and shareholders of these oil
companies, other companies in the energy industry, and other large
companies in any other major industry.
They are as follows:
* Has diversification by these oil companies been successful,
i.e. has the stock market looked favorably upon the diversi-
fication activities of these companies, thereby indicating
how beneficial and successful these activities have been?
* Have the companies' shareholders benefited with these acti-
vities, i.e. have managers' diversification decisions been
self-serving or in the interests of the stockholders?
* Has energy diversification been worthwhile? Non-energy?
Has one been more beneficial than the other?
* Is there a relation between the diversification activities
of these companies and their financial performance such
that recommendations can be made as to which activities
the companies should pursue in the future (and to what ex-
tent) and which not?
* Is a change in financial performance a consequence of di-
versification or v.v., i.e. does poor financial performance
lead these companies to diversify and/or change structure?
The means by which these and related issues shall be re-
solved is through examining the firms' stock returns throughout
the period and searching for relationships between these returns
and the companies' revenues. This analysis involves the use of
the Risk/Return Model introduced in Section II and a methodology
to be discussed in the next section.
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IV. Methodology
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Using the Risk/Return Model
Recent empirical research has shown that, on average,
diversified companies (primarily through acquisitions) earn
only normal or risk-adjusted rates of return on their invest-
ments in acquired companies. These rates of return are what
would have been predicted via the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) prior to the acquisitions. This is a strong statement
about the efficiency of the capital markets, but provides little
apparent support for corporate diversification. An efficient
capital market still allows for exceptional corporate perfor-
mance and high value acquisitions, however. In fact, exception-
al performances are expected, as are disastrous results. The
important point for the diversifying corporation (or the indi-
vidual investor) to remember is that slightly above average per-
formance on a consistent basis leads to spectacular results. Thus,
the challenge facing managers of diversifying companies is to
identify and make only those acquisitions that have a greater
value to the company's shareholders than the price paid for the
acquisition, i.e. identify positive net present value acquisi-
tions. The Risk/Return Model helps managers meet this challenge
and, in this case, determines if their efforts have been rewarded.
Whether or not corporate diversification through acquisi-
tion has created real economic value for shareholders of ac-
quiring firms has been the focus of numerous capital market
studies. These studies1 have attempted to test whether stock-
1. For example, the studies in refs. 2,9,17, and 24.
37
holders of acquiring firms have earned abnormal returns or
whether the separation of control from ownership in corpora-
tions has freed managers to view sales growth, rather than pro-
fitability, as their primary goal. The former notion is the
classic rationale for corporate diversification and the test
used herein is based on this notion. It is justified because
regardless of whether the gains from diversification take the
form of a tax gain, avoiding the costs of bankruptcy, diversifi-
cation economies, superior deployment of capital, or for some
other reason, gains from diversification should be reflected in
abnormal returns on the acquiring company's stock (unless the
market was fully capable of anticipating the consequences of
an acquisition or series of acquisitions long before they oc-
curred). Thus, a direct test of the benefits of diversification
is to examine the excess returns on acquiring firms' stocks.
Several measures of risk and return performance have been
2developed; measures which,respectively,estimate the degree to
which unsystematic risk has been reduced and the degree to which
actual rates of return exceed expected rates of return. The
measure used here,o, is an estimate of the degree to which as-
set returns exceed or fall below their associated market prices
of risk and is given by:
c< = (R i - Rf) - i(Rm- Rf) ,
in which the terms on the right side of the equation are as de-
2. Presented in ref. 2.
38
fined in Section II, where CAPM is introduced. In this study, o(
is a measure of whether or not a company's stockholders have
benefited from the company's diversification activities. It com-
pares a firm's actual returns given by Ri with what the market
would have predicted using CAPM prior to the occurrence of these
diversification activities.
o( is calculated herein on an annual basis from 1967 to 1981
for each company in the sample. All the financial information
pertinent to these calculations is contained in Appendix D,
Exhibits 1-5. Rm, Rf, and (Rm-Rf ) are presented for each year
from 1967-1981 in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 2 presents the observed
annual rates of return on each firm's stock or equity and the
associated risk premium. These are denoted as Roe and Roe- Rf,
respectively, where Roe (return on observed equity) is substi-
tuted for Ri in the previous equation. Exhibit 3 gives the
levels of systematic risk pertaining to each company on an an-
nual basis from 1967 to 1981. These are denoted as Noe (beta
on observed equity), which is the standard ý used in CAPM. Re-
call that foe is a measure of the sensitivity of a stock's price
to overall market fluctuations. Normally (and in this case)
Poe is derived from a least squares regression analysis between
weekly percent changes in the price of a stock and average week-
3. In that case, the market would have used expected values for
R , R , and .. In this study, actual values for R and R
a~e ued. ThIs was necessary because data on expected vales
prior to each period are not available. This is only impor-
tant for R,, however, because E(Rf) = Rf. Even so, since the
best expected value of Rm is the actual value, the actual
value is appropriate.
4. Based on data in ref. 25.
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ly percent changes in the price of a stock and average weekly
percent changes in the price of all stocks in the S & P 500
over a period of five years. The five year period chosen for
each annual ýoe in Exhibit 3 was not necessarily the previous
five years for each company. An appropriate five-year period
was chosen such that the Poe that appears is the one market
analysts would have used at the time to estimate the company's
annual return on stock; i.e., Poe is based on the structure of
the company and state of the industry as it existed at the time.
It does not include the effects of any unanticipated changes in
structure or sources of revenue due to acquisitions or other
diversification activity by the company during the year. In
this sense, the Poe'S given are expected values.
The equation for excess returns is now:
O(oe = (Roe- Rf) - @oe(Rm- R) (1)
where "oe" denotes observed equity or stock. But excess return
on stock is not the most appropriate indicator of the benefits
or costs of diversification to a firm. This is because a firm's
stock represents its levered assets and, as such, is affected
by the firm's debt level through U.S. tax benefits. (Interest
payments on debt are tax deductible, which means the U.S. Gov-
ernment partially subsidizes corporate debt.) Consequently,
Roe (and, therefore,<oe ) is influenced by the firm's chosen
debt-equity ratio (D/E). In order to separate out and elimin-
ate this influence of debt on excess returns so that relation-
ships (if they exist) can be more clearly inferred between the
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firms' excess returns and their diversification activities, an
all equity approach to the problem is taken. That is, the ex-
cess returns for the firms on an all equity basis (the same firms
with no debt outstanding) are derived and subsequently related
to diversification strategies.
To obtain the firms' excess returns on an all equity basis,
oe is first unlevered 5:
Pae = /oe/(1 + (1-t)D/E) (2)
where Pae is the systematic risk level for the equivalent all
equity,ae , firm, i.e., ae represents business risk only for
the firm;tis the corporate tax rate (48% before 1979, 46% from
1979 on); and D/E is the firm's debt-equity ratio. D is the
total debt of the firm (short-term + long-term); E is equity
in the form of common stock (price per share x number of shares
outstanding). Market rather than book values of D and E are
used.
From CAPM, ýoe = (Roe-Rf)/(Rm-Rf) and ýae = (Rae-Rf)/
(Rm-Rf), so equation (2) becomes:
(Rae- Rf) = (Roe- Rf)/(l + (1-t)D/E) (3).
Dividing equation (1) by the term 1 + (1-t) D/E and substitu-
ting the relations in (2) and (3), (1) becomes:
(Rae- Rf) - Pae(Rm- Rf) = m oe/(1  + (1-t)D/E) (4).
But, since the left side of equation (4) is equal to (ae,
5. Based on the formula presented in ref. 4, but equation (2)
is an improved version.
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(4) leads to:
(ae = Ooe/(1 + (1-t)D/E) (5)
where <ae gives the firm's excess returns on an all equity basis.
It is O(ae which should have a clearer relation to a firm's
diversification activities than eo(e
Exhibit 4 presents the sample companies' annual average
6debt-equity ratios from 1967 to 1981. These averages are ob-
tained from year-beginning and year-end values, equally weighted.
This data clearly shows which firms have aggressively used debt.
Using this data with the values of t and data from the previous
Exhibits in equations (1) and (5), the values of O(ae for each
firm from 1967 to 1981 are determined. These values are pre-
sented in Exhibit 5. The corresponding values of O<oe are given
to indicate the effects of debt on the firms' excess returns.
Methodology for Relating Returns to Diversification
The methodology used herein for determining if there are
relations between the all equity excess returns of Exhibit 5
and the companies' diversification strategies is straightforward.
It is based on the statistical analysis procedure detailed in
ref. 7. The aspects of this procedure important to this study
are presented here.
The procedure focuses on prediction analysis of cross
classifications of qualitative variables. Such variables are
6. Derived from data in refs. 16 and 25.
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represented by nominal or ordinal scales. A nominal scale de-
scribes objects or events by just one element of a set of mutu-
ally exclusive classes or states (e.g., from Appendices B and
C: Energy I, Energy II,. . . or Dominant Vertical, Dominant
Constrained, . . .). An ordinal scale orders or ranks vari-
ables in terms of the amount of the characteristic being measured
(e.g., as will be shown: Superior, Stable, and Inferior for ex-
cess returns). Generally, the analysis involves predictions of
the effects of one or more independent variables on a dependent
variable. A hypothesis is formulated concerning some relation
between the dependent variable and the independent variables
(i.e. a prediction is made) and an analysis of the data results
in a statement of the validity of the hypothesis through some
statistical measures. The extent to which a hypothesis is
successful in predicting events described by the dependent vari-
able is evaluated, rather than its goodness of fit.
Event predictions may differ on several dimensions. The
dimensions important to this study are accuracy, scope, and
precision. Accuracy is the extent to which a prediction is cor-
rect (and error is minimized). Scope increases with the range
of observations included in the data. Precision measures the
degree to which a prediction specifies the uniqueness of the
dependent variable - the more unique the predicted outcome, the
more precise the proposition. Generally, there are tradeoffs
among these dimensions; e.g., the greater a prediction's
scope and precision, the more difficult it is to achieve pre-
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diction accuracy. These tradeoffs need to be considered in an
evaluation of prediction success.
The analysis methodology provides a unique measure,Vp, for
each logically distinct hypothesis. The subscript P on the
basic measure symbol V(read "del") indicates the specific pre-
diction to which the methodology is applied. V is a measure of
a prediction's success in matching data; i.e., it indicates how
well a theory matches outcomes from a particular data sample.
Vcan take on any value from -ooto 1, depending on the hypo-
thesis and the data. A V of 1 means the data perfectly matches
the prediction. V = 0.5 means the hypothesis has a 50% better-
than-chance probability of being correct based on what the data
shows. (Conversely, 7= -0.5 means the hypothesis is 50% worse
than chance.) Lastly, V= 0.0 means the hypothesis is no better
than chance in its predictive capability. A hypothesis with a
Vof 20% or better is generally assumed to be successful.
The equation forV7p is:
Vp = 1 - Pri/jP Pri Prj
i j
where the summations are performed over each error cell in the
cross-classification or contingency table (which shows the re-
lations between the dependent variable and independent variables
in the data). i denotes the row containing the error cell;
J denotes the column. Pri/j is the conditional probability
associated with the error cell; Pr. and Pr. are the associated
marginal probabilities. The term "error cell" refers to a parti-
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cular cross-classification in the table that is contrary to the
hypothesis being tested and, therefore, is in "error". The more
data that appears in the error cells, the smaller will be the
value of Vp and the less reliable the prediction. Note the
formula for Vp contains adjustments for scope and precision.
These adjustments are inherent in the denominator term Pri Prj.
To illustrate the analysis procedure using Vp, consider
the following example based on the data in this study:
Let the hypothesis, P = O, be : "Dominant vertical com-
panies have had stable to superior all equity excess returns
throughout the period from 1967 to 1981". The associated con-
tingency table is as shown.
Structural Category
DV DC DL DU AC
Superior
(>5%)
Stable
Ca e (-5% to 5%)
Inferior
(<-5%)
74 i=1
48 i=2
58 i=3
24 31 53 57 15 180j=l j=2 j=3 j=4 J=5
The error cell for this hypothesis is shaded and the appropri-
ate value of V is:
V7 =1 8/1800 (58/180)(24/180) - -0.0314
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27
10
16
8
8
8
12
6
13
22
18
17
5
6
4
i
The hypothesis is not successful; the data indicates it is
3.4% worse than chance.
Note the limits on o(ae that determine if it is superior,
stable, or inferior have been somewhat arbitrarily chosen.
They are, however, based on the opinion that if there have
been real benefits (or costs) of diversification by the com-
panies, the value of a<ae should exceed 5% (or fall below -5%).
It is believed diversification or non-diversification has had
little effect, neither beneficial nor harmful, if (ae falls
between -5% and 5%.
The next section is devoted to testing further hypotheses
related to the effects of diversification on the oil companies'
excess returns. Based on the results of these tests, conclu-
sions will be drawn on the companies' diversification strategies
from which recommendations for future actions might be made.
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V. Analysis
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Procedure
Utilizing the methodology presented in Section IV with
appropriate company data from the Appendices, the effects of
oil company diversification on the value of the firms will be
determined. Specifically, through the testing of several hy-
potheses relating the structure of the firms (and their areas
of diversification) to excess returns on equity, measures of
the benefits or costs of diversification to the firms' share-
holders will be obtained.
The hypotheses to be considered come in two groups - those
relating the companies' excess returns to their structural cate-
gories (summarized in Appendix C) and those relating excess
returns to the revenue segments Energy II and Non-Energy II,
found in Appendix B. By performing the analysis in this fashion,
both general and specific relations between excess returns and
diversification may be discovered. Diversification by these
companies is generally represented by their structural category.
A DV firm is one that is least diversified. DC, DL, and DU
symbolize increasing degrees of diversification. AC is the
extreme. Diversification is more specifically represented by
the revenue segments in which the companies are engaged. The
primary business segments of the companies are contained in
Energy I and Non-Energy I. The diversified segments appear in
Energy II and Non-Energy II.
In both groups, the hypotheses seek to uncover relations
between stable to superior excess returns or inferior excess
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returns and diversification. They can take either a lenient
or strict form. An example of the lenient form was given in
Section IV where the hypothesis was: "DV companies have had
stable to superior all equity excess returns . . .". The
strict form of this is: "Only DV companies have had stable to
superior all equity excess returns . . .". Generally, the
strict form hypotheses are less successful than their lenient
counterparts (i.e., have correspondingly lower values of Vp)
because they have more error cells associated with them. (In
the example cited, the extra error cells are i = 1 and i = 2
for j = 2 through 5. Thus, eight error cells are added to the
single error cell at (i = 3, J = 1).) Only if these extra
error cells have zero or very low conditional probabilities
(i.e., contain few or no observations) will the strict form
hypothesis be more successful than the lenient form.
Once the form of the hypotheses and how and to what they
should be applied was decided, the major issue to be resolved
was how should the data be viewed for analysis. Specifically,
over what time periods should the excess returns be cumulated
and the various hypotheses be tested? A number of possibilities
were apparent. The hypotheses could be tested on an annual
basis on the excess returns in each year, or over a period of
years on the excess returns in each year in the period. The
former basis has the advantage that the periods are all of equal
length (yearly) and excess returns from different years are not
mixed. This basis is believed to be inappropriate for this
study, however, because the resulting data used for hypothesis
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testing is too limited; i.e., it is not sufficiently robust.
Each year yields only twelve data points (excess returns) for
the twelve companies.
A multi-year period basis for testing the hypotheses is
more statistically robust than the annual basis since it em-
ploys more data, but any number of periods could be selected
if done at random. The periods used in this study were chosen
after considering several others, based on different criteria.
Among these were a period spanning all years in the study (1967 -
1981) and periods that spanned the pre-embargo, post-embargo/
pre-price rise, and post-price rise years (1967-1.972, 1973-1978,
and 1979-1981, respectively). The first choice gives the most
statistically robust results, while the second choice accounts
for major changes in oil market conditions through the years.
Both choices were used in analyses that yielded no conclusive
results, but they were rejected as bases of analysis in favor
of a basis that may not have yielded any more conclusive re-
sults, but is judged more appropriate. That basis is one in
which the periods are chosen such that no company changes struc-
tural category in any year in a given period. This applies to
the first group of hypotheses for studying the effects of di-
versification through structural category. For the second group
in which diversification is reflected in participation in dif-
ferent revenue segments, a similar basis was used whereby the
companies in a particular revenue segment (Energy II or Non-En-
ergy II) are the same throughout each period. This basis results
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in the following analysis periods for the two groups:
Structural Category
DV
GULF,SOCAL
TEX
1968-70 SOCAL,TEX
1971-72 same
1973
1974
1975-76
1977-78
1979-81
same
same
TEX
same
same
DC
ARCO,XON,
SHELL, SOIND
ARCO,XON,
GULF,SHELL
same
XON,SHELL
SHELL
SHELL,SOCAL
none
none
DL
MOBIL,SUN
MOBIL,SOIND,
SUN
DU
SOHIO,UNION
same
MOBIL,SOIND SOHIO,SUN,
UNION
ARCO,GULF,
MOBIL,SOIND
ARCO,XON,
GULF,SOIND
same
same
MOBIL,SOHIO,
SUN,UNION
same
XON,GULF, ARCO,MOBIL,
SHELL,SOCAL, SOHIO,SUN,
SOIND UNION
XON,GULF,
SHELL,SOCAL
AC
TENN
same
same
same
same
same
same
ARCO,MOBIL, same
SOIND,SOHIO,
SUN,UNION
Span
1967
Energy II
ARCO,XON,
SOHIO
1968-74 add GULF
1975-76 add SUN
Revenue Segment
Span Non-Energy II
1967-76 all except
ARCO,GULF,
SOCAL,TEX
1977-81 add ARCO,
SOCAL
1977-78 add SHELL,
UNION
1979-81 add SOIND
Span Both
1967-74 XON,SOHIO
1975-76 add SUN
1977-78 add ARCO,
SHELL,UNION
1979-81 add SOIND
Neither
GULF,SOCAL,
TEX
1968-76 SOCAL,TEX
1977-81 TEX
Span
1967
Span
1967
In both groups, hypothesis testing will determine if diversi-
fication results in stable to superior excess returns, inferior
excess returns, or neither of these to any significant extent.
Recall that this task is accomplished through the measure Vp
which indicates a successful hypothesis if it exceeds 20%.
Hypothesis Testing and Results
Let P = 1 and P = 2 denote hypotheses relating diversifica-
tion through changes in structural category to all equity excess
returns. P = 1 relates structural category to stable to superior
returns, while P = 2 relates the categories to inferior returns.
The lenient and strict forms are tested for both hypotheses.
The lenient form of P = 1 is: " companies have had stable
to superior excess returns in each time period", where the blank
contains the terms DV, DC, DL, DU, and AC, successively. The
strict form is: "Only companies have had stable to
superior excess returns in each time period". The lenient and
strict forms of P = 2 are the same except "stable to superior"
is replaced by "inferior". The results of the tests of these
hypotheses are as follows:
P = 1 (lenient form)
Structural Category
Span DV DC DL DU AC
1967 S(.20) N N N S(1.0)
1968-70 N N N N N
1971-72 S(.25) N S(1.0) N S(1.0)
1973 S(1.0) S(1.0) N S(1.0) S(1.0)
1974 S(I.0) S(I.0) S(1.0) N S(1.0)
1975-76 N S(.40) N N N
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1977-78 N
1979-81 N
no data
no data
S(.28)
N
(3,1) (3,2) (3,3) (3,4) (3,5)
P = 1 (strict form)
DC
N
N
N
N
N
N
no
Structural Category
DL
N
N
S(.20)
N
N
N
data N
no data
(3,1)(1,2)to(1,
(2,2)to(2,
(3,
(1,
(1,
(2,
(2,
(1,
(1,
(2,
(2,
(3,3)(1,1)(1,2)(1,4)(1,5)
(2,1)(2,2)
(2,4)(2,5)
(3,4)
(1,1)
(1,3)(2,1)
(2,3)
(3,5)
(1,1)to(1,4)
(2,1)to(2,4)
(1,
(1,
(2,
(2,
P = 2 (lenient
Span
1967
1968-70
1971-72
1973
1974
1975-76
1977-78
1979-81
DV
N
S(.20)
N
N
(1,1)(2,1) (1,2)(2,2) (1,3)(2,3) (1,4)(2,4) (1,5)(2,5)
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Error
cells
(iiJ)
Span
1967
1968-70
1971-72
1973
1974
1975-76
1977-78
1979-81
DV
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
DU
N
N
N
N
N
N
S(.20)
N
AC
N
N
N
N
N
NN
NN
Error
cells
(i,j )
form)
DC
N
N
s(.44)
N
DL
N
N
N
S(.20)
N
N
DU
N
N
N
N
S(.20)
N
AC
N
N
N
N
N
N
no data
no data
Error
cells
(i,j)
_ __ ~
P = 2 (strict form)
DV
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
(1,1) (2,1)
(3,2)to(3,5)
DC
N
N
S(.44)
N
N
no data
no data
(1,2)(2,2)
(3,1)(3,3)
(3,4)(3,5)
DL
N
N
N
s(.31)
N
N
N
N
(1,3)(2,3)
(3,1)(3,2)
(3,4)(3,5)
DU
N
N
N
N
S(.31)
N
N
N
(1,4)(2,4)
(3,1)(3,2)
(3,3)(3,5)
N means the hypothesis is not successful; the corresponding
value of V is less than +20%. S means the hypothesis is success-
ful; the corresponding value of V is given, and equals or exceeds
+20%. The error cells in the contingency table that correspond
to each hypothesis are indicated. The form of these contingency
tables is the same as the one shown in Section IV. Only the dis-
tribution of data changes with each period analyzed.
No strong conclusions can be drawn from these results with
regard to stating which structural category is more likely to
result in stable to superior or inferior all equity excess re-
turns. This is due to the fact that few hypotheses met with suc-
cessful results. The most successes appeared when testing the
lenient form P = 1 hypotheses, but these successes were evenly
dispersed across all structural categories. Thus, again, no one
category could be cited as being more profitable than another.
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Span
1967
1968-70
1971-72
1973
1974
1975-76
1977-78
1979-81
Error
cells
(i,j )
AC
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
(1,5)
(2,5)
(3,1)to
(3,4)
Also, no group of categories could be shown to be superior to
another (e.g., the less diversified, DV and DC, to the more di-
versified, DU and AC). This latter fact is clear from the lack
of bias in successes (in the lenient form P = 1 hypotheses and
the others) moving from one structural category to another.
From the results of testing the hypotheses anlayzing diver-
sification through changes in structural category, no clear
case can be made for or against diversification by the oil com-
panies. The results may be more explicit for the hypotheses
relating diversification by participation in different revenue
segments to all equity excess returns. Let P - 3 and P - 4
denote the appropriate set of hypotheses. P = 3 relates parti-
cipation and non-participation in the revenue segments Energy II
and/or Non-Energy II to stable to superior excess returns. P = 4
does the same, but relates them to inferior returns. (Recall
that Energy II and Non-Energy II represent the diversified re-
venue segments of the firms.)
Both the lenient and strict forms of the P = 3 and P = 4
hypotheses are tested. The lenient form of P = 3 is: "Com-
panies that have revenues derived from either/both/ neither of
the Energy II and Non-Energy II revenue segments have had stable
to superior excess returns in each time period". The strict
form is identical, but begins with the word "only". The same
is true for the lenient and strict forms of P = 4, except
"stable to superior" is replaced by "inferior". The test
results of these hypotheses are as follows:
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P = 3 (lenient form)
Span E II Span
1967 S(1.0) 1967-76
1968-74 N 1977-81
1975-76 N
1977-78 N
1979-81 S(.22)
NE II Span
N 1967-74
N 1975-76
1977-78
1979-81
Both Span
S(.40) 1967
N 1968-76
N 1977-81
N
P = 3 (strict form)
Span E II
1967 s(.38)
1968-74 N
1975-76 N
1977-78 N
1979-81 S(.20)
Span
1967-76
1977-81
NE II Span Both
N 1967-74 N
N 1975-76 N
1977-78 N
1979-81 N
P = 4 (lenient form)
Span E II
1967 N
1968-74 N
1975-76 N
1977-78 S(.20)
1979-81 N
Span NE II Span Both
1967-76 N 1967-74 N
1977-81 N 1975-76 N
1977-78 S(.20)
1979-81 N
Span
1967
1968-76
1977-81
Neither
N
N
N
P = 4 (strict form)
Span E II Span NE II Span Both Span
1967 N 1967-76 N 1967-74 N 1967
1968-74 N 1977-81 N 1975-76 N 1968-76
1975-76 N 1977-78 S(.20) 1977-81
1977-78 S(.20) 1979-81 N
1979-81 N
Neither
N
N
N
E II denotes Energy II; NE II denotes Non-Energy II. N and S
mean the same as before. The corresponding V value is given for
Neither
S(.20)
N
N
Span
1967
1968-76
1977-81
Neither
N
N
N
each successful hypothesis. (Recall that V= +20% means the hy-
pothesis has a probability of success of 20% better than chance,
based on the data.) The error cell in the contingency table for
the lenient form P = 3 hypotheses is located at (i=3, j=1); for
the strong form P = 3 hypotheses, the error cells are at (i=3,
=1l), (i=1, j=2), and (i=2, j=2). The error cells for the len-
ient form P = 4 hypotheses are located at (i=1l, =1l) and (i=2,
j=l); for the strong form P = 4 hypotheses, they are at (i=l,
j=1), (i=2, j=1), and (i=3, J=2). The general form of the con-
tingency table is as shown, with only the distribution of data
changing in each time period. X represents Energy II, Non-
Energy II, Both, or Neither depending on the hypothesis being
tested; Y is the particular span of years.
Contingency Table X Not X
Span Y Superior
(>+5%)
Stable
(-5% to 5%)
Inferior
(<-5%)
i=1
i=2
i=3
j=l j=2
Similar to the results of the previous hypotheses relating
structural category to excess returns, these results offer no
clear proof that diversification by the oil companies into or
not into businesses in the Energy II and/or Non-Energy II seg-
ments has led to either stable to superior or inferior excess
returns. (Although a weak argument can be made that those com-
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panies in the Energy II segment have benefited. This is based
on the two successes for the strict form P = 3 hypotheses in the
E II segment, modified by the one success for the strict form
P = 4 hypotheses in the same segment. But this finding hardly
leads to a generalization. Successes and failures of the hypo-
theses are otherwise evenly dispersed in the results.)
Clearly, these findings point to the same general conclu-
sion as before: that diversification by the oil companies has
neither been harmful nor beneficial to the companies' stock
price performance, as measured by all equity excess returns.
Thus, stockholders in these companies have neither experienced
significant increases nor decreases in the value of their hold-
ings due to the companies' diversification strategies from 1967
to 1981. The word "significant" is meant to have a two-fold
meaning here. It implies that the firms' excess returns may
have been affected by diversification, but, statistically speak-
ing,they have not been appreciably nor consistently affected.
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VI. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations
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Conclusions
It is clear from the tests of the hypotheses in the pre-
vious section that the recent diversification strategies of major
oil companies have generally not significantly affected their
returns on equity. That is, diversification by these companies
has neither been harmful nor beneficial to the firms' shareholders
in a consistent or distinct manner. Diversification has not sig-
nificantly increased nor decreased the value of the firms' stocks.
This conclusion is based on a study of the firms' excess returns
on equity, on an all equity basis. The analysis procedure is
justified as it employs contemporary techniques in financial eco-
nomics. The analysis sample is sufficiently wide-ranging in the
degree of diversification of the firms so that the analysis con-
tains comparisons between the least and most diversified com-
1panies in the industry. No significant difference can be dis-
tinguished in the excess stock returns among these companies
over time.
Perhaps the most obvious reason for these results is that
the sheer size of the oil companies compared to their diversify-
ing acquisitions has prevented these acquisitions from having
significant effects on the stock returns of the companies. Spe-
cifically, the size of the revenues in the oil-related business,
2
compared to the diversified areas, has been so large as to pre-
1. Also, the size of the firms is generally the same in terms
of total revenues, so size is not an important factor in
the analysis.
2. See Appendix B for the contribution to total revenues from
Energy I + Non-Energy I compared to those from Energy II +
Non-Energy II, for each company.
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clude the possibility that non-oil-related activities would af-
fect the companies' performances, as reflected in their excess
stock returns. This is true for all the companies from the
Dominant Verticals to the Dominant Unrelateds, and, to some ex-
tent, for the Acquisitive Conglomerate Tenneco, when acquisitions
are considered on an individual basis.
It is probable then, that for any company in the dominant
business category (where a single business accounts for 70-95%
of the firm's total revenues), a relatively minor diversifying
acquisition will not affect the firm's stock returns. Extend-
ing this, the same might be said for any firm making a diversify-
ing acquisition resulting in minor changes in revenues. This is
to be expected since a firm's stock price performance reflects
the market's assessment of its present and future cash flows.
Thus, the recent diversifying acquisitions by the oil com-
panies have not been as disastrous nor massive as many articles
have proposed. These articles point to the foundered efforts
of Exxon and Mobil to manage an electric company (Reliance)
and retailer (Montgomery Ward), respectively, and Sohio's take-
over of a second-rate, badly run producer of copper (Kennecott)
as typical examples. Yet, even these large, generally criticized
takeovers have had little effect from the analysis results on the
firms' stock performance because of their small size in compari-
son to the companies' main business. The companies' shareholders
may not have been served well by these and other acquisitions,
3. See, for example, refs. 3,18,20, and 22.
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but they have neither been disserved by them.
As an aside, the issue of whether diversification by the oil
companies has been a reactive rather than proactive strategy was
investigated. That is, the possibility that diversification has
been undertaken by the companies as a result of superior or in-
ferior excess returns, rather than resulting in these returns,
was considered. To determine this, a qualitative analysis was
performed using the information in Appendix E combined with that
in Appendix B. Appendix E was compiled using the data in Appen-
dix D, Exhibit 5. It ranks the companies in each year of the
study period according to their all equity excess returns, and
bands them in groups of those companies obtaining superior,
stable, or inferior returns.
After comparing the timing of various companies' diver-
sification activities (represented by changes in structural cate-
gory and/or entry into a new revenue segment) against the all
equity excess returns performance of each company in the years
just preceeding diversification, no relation is discernible be-
tween the two. Diversification was equally undertaken following
superior excess returns as it was following inferior returns.
More than likely, a detailed, quantitative analysis of the data
(through hypothesis testing) would have yielded the same result
as this qualitative analysis. Excess returns on equity seem to
have no bearing on oil companies' decisions to implement diversi-
fication strategies. The factors which do compel these strate-
gies are probably many, varying from taking advantage of chance
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opportunities to fulfillment of long-range planning goals.
Recommendations
From the preceding remarks, it might be construed that be-
cause the oil companies have really not been adversely affected
by their largely criticized diversification activities, they
should continue with these efforts until they hit upon some "real
winners". This is an attractive strategy to implement from an
individual investor's point of view, but it is hardly a viable
or responsible position for the managers of major oil companies
to assume. They could hardly adopt this strategy without adverse
reaction from various sources (e.g. the Federal Trade Commission).
These managers must show they are acting in the best interests
of the firms' stockholders. They must also be ready to respond
to criticism from those who, on the one hand, see the oil com-
panies as using windfall energy profits to improperly expand into
non-energy enterprises, and those who, as anti-trusters inside
and outside the government, are rankled by oil company mergers
and energy-related acquisitions. Even so, the potential benefits
of diversification to the oil companies are real and should not
be overlooked.
Both energy-related and non-energy-related diversification
should continue by the oil companies, tempered by adequate ques-
tioning of the real justifications involved and adequate con-
sideration of the implications for the firms. As large and high-
ly profitable vertically integrated, virtually single-industry
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firms, the oil companies are vulnerable to the rise of trouble-
some events (e.g., the recent drop in oil prices). To alleviate
the effects of these events and to provide for a more secure and
profitable future, these companies need to change themselves
through diversification, which must come largely via acquisitions,
rather than internal development, because of the companies' enor-
mous size and homogeneity. At the same time, certain non-pro-
fitable operating segments of the companies should be sold off,
at values considerably higher than might ordinarily seem pos-
14
sible, to help finance these acquisitions.
Note that it is not recommended the oil companies all become
acquisitive conglomerates, with more businesses, markets, and
technologies than the chief executive officer can reasonably un-
derstand. It is simply suggested that they build a more balanced
and safer asset base by diversifying sensibly into sound, related
or unrelated activities with cognate technologies, comprehensible
markets, and comfortable manageability. Not only the oil com-
panies, but the markets into which they diversify will benefit
as a result. These markets will be helped by the influx of sub-
stantial capital sums, technological and commercial expertise,
and the spirit of enterprise which has always been one of the oil
companies' main characteristics.
To help silence some its critics and meet the challenges
likely to come from the government and others, the oil industry
needs to do a better job of explaining why diversification is
4. See ref. 8 for comparison between the existing market value
of Mobil Oil Corporation and its "unbundled" value.
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warranted. It should be made clear that, in the long run, oil
operations alone cannot be expected to ensure adequate earnings
for the companies' shareholders, let alone adequate energy sup-
plies for their customers. The companies need to diversify where-
ever and whenever economically and strategically appropriate to
help obtain adequate earnings (at no apparent cost in equity
returns) and to help develop alternative energy sources.
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Appendix A
Sample Companies' Present Business and
Diversification Activities from 1967-1981
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ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY (ARCO)
Present Business
Arco, with its subsidiaries, is engaged in the explora-
tion for, and development, production, purchase, trans-
portation and sale of, petroleum; in the manufacturing.
transportation and marketing of refined petroleum pro-
ducts including petrochemicals; in the mining and sale
of coal; in mining, processing, and sale of primary
copper, aluminum, uranium, molybdenum, silver, and other
metals; and in the manufacturing and sale of copper,
copper alloy, aluminum, and other metal products. Oper-
ations are conducted principally in the United States.
The Company also obtains quantities of crude petroleum
from its interests in Indonesia, which it either sells
outside the U.S. or imports for use in its refineries.
It also sells certain of its refined products in Brazil
and elsewhere in world markets. Arco comprises one of
the large integrated enterprises in the petroleum in-
dustry.
Acquisitions, Divestments and Other Activities (1967-81)
On Apr. 17, 1967 acquired Nuclear Materials & Equipment
Corp., producer of uranium and plutonium bearing fuels.
Sold in 1971.
On Mar. 4, 1969, merged with Sinclair Oil Corp.
In April 1973, acquired R.N. Parsons & Son, Inc., Parsons
Transport Inc., Parsons Leasing Inc., and Parsons Termin-
al, Inc.
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In Sept. 1974, Company sold United Kingdom marketing faci-
lities and business formerly owned by ARCO Petroleum Ltd.,
a subsidiary company.
On Dec. 5, 1974, Company's 50% interest in American Chemi-
cal Co. was sold to Stauffer Chemical Co.
In May 1976, sold East Chicago, Ind. refinery and certain
related assets to CF Petroleum Co. for $80 million plus
other considerations.
In Aug. 1976, sold Atlantic Richfield Canada Ltd. to Petro-
Canada for $340 million (Co. received about $66 million net).
In Sept. 1976 acquired the Observer, a British newspaper.
On Jan. 12, 1977, Anaconda Co. was merged into a wholly
owned subsidiary of Atlantic Richfield pursuant to a Plan
and Agreement of Reorganization dated July 26, 1976. In
connection with the merger, Atlantic Richfield issued
approximately 8.1 million shares of common stock valued
at $420 million and paid approximately $97 million in cash.
Atlantic Richfield had previously acquired on Mar. 31, 1976,
27% of Anaconda common stock in a cash tender offer for
approximately $167 million.
In Apr. 1977, Arco Polymers Inc., subsidiary, acquired the
La Porte, TX polypropylene facility and business of Dia-
mond Shamrock Corp. for approximately $150 million.
In Oct..1977, Company acquired the assets of Solar Tech-
nology International, Inc., Chatsworth CA, a developer and
producer of photovoltaic cells which convert solar energy
into electricity.
In Mar. 1978, Co. acquired a minority interest of North-
rup, Inc.
In 1978, Co. expanded into international coal operations
by purchasing an interest in R.W. Miller (Holdings) Ltd.,
a major Australian coal concern.
In Dec. 1979, acquired Swisher Coal Co. (renamed Beaver
Creek Coal Co. in Feb. 1980).
In mid June, 1980, Co. purchased Halcon International
Inc.'s interest in Oxirane Chemical Company and other
joint ventures for approximately $270 million and the
assumption of certain liabilities including approxi-
mately $380 million of long-term debt. Oxirane is now
a wholly-owned subsidiary.
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In Jan. 1980, formed ARCO Ventures Co., a new subsidiary.
In June 1980, acquired Wisconsin Centrifugal Inc. thru
an exchange of shares.
In Aug. 1980, sold remaining 60% interest in Colony Oil
Shale development project.
On Jan. 1, 1981, formed ARCO Alaska Inc., a new subsidiary.
On Dec. 31, 1981, the Anaconda Co. was merged into
Atlantic Richfield.
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EXXON CORPORATION (XON)
Present Business
Exxon Corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliated
companies operate in the United States and nearly 100 other
countries. The principal business is energy, involving
exploration for and production of crude oil and natural
gas and petroleum products; exploration for and mining
and sale of coal and uranium and fabrication of nuclear
fuel. Exxon Chemical Company is a major manufacturer
and marketer of petrochemicals. Exxon is also engaged in
exploration for and mining of minerals other than coal and
uranium. Reliance Electric Company, an affiliate, manu-
factures, markets, and services a broad line of indus-
trial equipment. Exxon conducts extensive research pro-
grams in support of these businesses and provides capital
to innovative new ventures, some of which are not related
to these businesses.
The regional and operating organizations established
to assist Corporation in its activities are as follows,
with an explanation of the activities of each:
Divisions
Esso Middle East: Oil and gas interests in Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Lebanon.
Exxon Chemical Company: Chemical interests worldwide.
Exxon Company, U.S.A.: Oil, gas, oil shale, and coal in-
terests in the United States.
Exxon Enterprises Inc.: Advanced office systems; nuclear
fuel; service station equipment; new business development
outside the oil, chemicals, and minerals fields.
Exxon International Company: International trading in
crude oil and petroleum products; marine transportation
and technical services.
Exxon Minerals Company: Non-hydrocarbon mineral inter-
ests worldwide except Canada.
Affiliates
Esso Eastern Inc. (100%); Oil, gas, oil shale, and coal
interests in the Far East, South and Southeast Asia,
and Australia.
Esso Europe Inc. (100%): Oil and gas interests in
Europe and Africa.
Esso Exploration Inc. (100%): Oil and gas exploration,
principally in Africa, Europe, and Asia; and mobile mar-
ine drilling worldwide except in Canada and the United
States.
Esso Inter-America Inc.: Oil, gas, coal, and synthetic
fuels interests in Central and South America and the
Caribbean.
Exxon Production Research Company: Research on the ex-
ploration and production of oil, gas, coal, oil shale,
and other hydrocarbon minerals.
Exxon Research and Engineering Company: Fundamental
research; research and development of oil, gas, oil
shale, and coal products and processes; engineering
services worldwide.
Imperial Oil Limited (70%): Oil and gas interests, chem-
icals, fabricated products, and mineral exploration in
Canada.
Reliance Electric Company: Electrical, mechanical,
electronic, weighing, and telecommunications compon-
ents and systems worldwide.
Acquisitions, Divestments and Other Activities (1967-81)
In 1967, Humble Oil & Refining Co. (now Exxon Co., U.S.A.,division), acquired from Standard Oil Co. of Cal. its
service stations and related properties previously
operated under Signal brand.
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On Jan. 1, 1973 merged Humble Oil & Refining Co., Esso
Chemical Co., Inc., and Enjay Chemical Co., wholly-owned
subsidiaries. Their businesses are now being conducted
as operating divisions of Corporation. Humble Oil &
Refining Co. became Exxon Co., U.S.A. and Esso Chemical
Co., Inc. became Exxon Chemical Co., both divisions of
Corporation. Enjay Chemical Co.,became Exxon Chem. Co.
U.S.A., a division of Exxon Chemical Co.
In Dec. 1973, sold its interests in Esso Philippines
Inc. and Bataan Refining Corp. to the Philippine Govern-
ment for cash and assumption of liabilities.
In July, 1975 merged Creole Petroleum Corp. into Esso
Holdings, Inc., a subsidiary of Co.
In Aug. 1975 Exxon Nuclear Co., Inc., subsidiary, formed
a subsidiary, Exxon Nuclear International Inc., to fur-
ther Exxon Nuclear Co's. development of nuclear fuel
cycle products and services business outside the U.S.
In Oct. 1976, Exxon Nuclear Co., subsidiary, formed sub-
sidiary, Exxon Nuclear G.m.b.H., West Germany, to own
and operate nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Lingen,
West Germany.
In Jan. 1978, Exxon Minerals International, Inc., sub-
sidiary, acquired approximately 87% outstanding shares of
Compania Minera Disputada de las Condes S.A.
In April 1978, Chagrin Valley Co., acquired assets of
Nevamar division of Exxon Chemical Co. U.S.A., subsidiary,
for an undisclosed amount of cash.
In April 1979, EssochemPlastics N.V., Co., affiliate,
acquired U.S.I. Europe N.V., which owns and operates
a polyethylene plant in Europe.
Through a tender offer, effective Sept. 24, 1979, by
a wholly owned subsidiary, and a merger later in the year,
the corporation acquired all of the outstanding capital
stock of Reliance Electric Co. The total acquisition
cost, including capitalized expenses was $1.24 billion.
In Aug. 1980, Co. said its Exxon U.S.A. division com-
pleted its previously reported acquisition of Atlantic
Richfield Co.'s 60% interest in the Colony Shale Oil
Project for $300 million. Co. will pay an additional
$100 million if production begins by 1985.
In early 1981, Imperial Oil Ltd., a subsidiary, acquired
all outstanding shares of Byron Creek Collieries Ltd.
In Dec. 1981, Co. relinquished concessionary interests
in Libya.
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GULF OIL CORP. (GULF)
Present Business
The Company is primarily an integrated petroleum com-
pany with secondary operations in the chemicals, minerals,
and nuclear industries. Petroleum revenues are derived
from the production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural
gas liquids, as well as the refining and marketing of gaso-
lines, distillates, and residual fuel oils. Petroleum
revenues are also obtained from the transportation of
crude and products by the Company's international tanker
fleet. Chemicals revenues consist of petrochemicals,
plastics, and a variety of industrial and specialty chemi-
cals. Minerals revenues are derived from the sale of coal
and uranium.
The Company and its domestic subsidiaries own re-
serves of crude petroleum in numerous fields in the Mid-
Continent and Gulf Coast areas, and to a lesser extent
in Arkansas, California, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana,
and Kentucky.
Acquisitions, Divestmentsand Other Activities (1967-81)
In Oct. 1967, acquired General Dynamics Corp.'s General
Atomic division for an undisclosed sum. General Atomic
Co., headquartered in San Diego, Cal., is engaged in
nuclear research, production of nuclear fuel, and build-
ing of nuclear steam systems for electricity generating
plants.
In 1971, Key International Drilling Company Ltd. (Keydril)
was formed as an international offshore drilling con-
tractor.
In Dec. 1973, formed Gulf Energy & Minerals Co., subsidi-
ary, to "focus corporate effort on energy sources other
than crude oil and natural gas", and a new unit, Gulf Oil
Trading & Development Co., to coordinate Co.'s activities
involving Mideast production countries.
During 1974, several new companies were created including
Global Energy Operations and Management Co. to offer
petroleum operating and management skills to foreign
governments on a contract basis.
Also in 1976, Co. Joined local interests to become a 35%
participant in the newly formed Asia Polymer Corporation,
which will manufacture low-density polyethylene in
Taiwan.
On Sept. 19, 1977, Co. acquired Kewanee Industries, Inc.
for an aggregate cash purchase price of $455 million.
In Apr. 1979, acquired a 30% equity interest in Taita
Chemical Co. Ltd., Taiwan.
In Dec. 1979, acquired Amalgamated Bonanza Petroleum Ltd.
for $2 million in cash and 1.65 million shares of common
stock issued by Gulf Canada Ltd.
On Mar. 18, 1980, Woods Petroleum Corp. sold its Hartzog
Draw oil and gas properties in Wyoming to Co. for
$22.5 million.
In Apr. 1980, Co. sold 10 million shares of Gulf Canada
Ltd. for an after-tax profit of $100 million, reducing
Gulf's interest in Gulf Canada to 60%.
In June 1980, sold its 45% interest in Okinawa Seklyu
Seisel refinery and in Aug., its 50% interest in Korea
Oil Corp. a refining and marketing concern.
In mid-1981, Co. entered into a $120 million joint ven-
ture with Republic Steel Corp. to own and operate Repub-
lic's North River coal properties in AL.
Also in mid-1981, Co. acquired Kemmerer Coal Co. of
Frontier, WY for $331 million. Kemmerer, a privately
held company, produced 4,300,000 tons of coal in 1980 from
an open-pit mine in Kemmerer WY. In addition to Kem-
merer's coal reserves in Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado,
Co. said the acquisition includes some natural gas
production and reserves.
In Aug. 1981, subsidiary, Pittsburgh & Midway Coal
Mining Co., acquired Kemmerer Co.,WYfor $330 million.
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MOBIL CORPORATION (MOBIL)
Present Business
Company conducts its business through three principal
operating subsidiaries: Mobil Oil Corp., Montgomery Ward
& Co., Inc. (Wards), and Container Corp. of America
(Container), each of which is directly or indirectly
totally owned by Mobil Corp. Mobil Oil conducts an in-
tegrated international energy business in exploration,
production, transportation, refining, and marketing of
petroleum and natural gas products, and in the manufac-
ture and marketing of chemicals.
Wards is one of the world's largest merchandising or-
ganizations, with 389 retail department stores in 42 states
and a nation-wide catalog order business.
Container manufactures and sells corrugated and
solid fiber shipping containers, folding cartons, com-
posite cans, fiber drums, paper bags, plastic packaging,
and paperboard in the form of container-board and bow-
board.
In addition, W.F. Hall Printing Co., acquired in
1979, is engaged in printing, binding, and mailing cata-
logs for mail-order houses and other industrial compan-
ies, and magazines for publishers of periodicals. It
also produces pocket size, paper covered, books.
Acquisitions, Divestments and Other Activities (1967-81)
In 1968, acquired assets of Goodling Electric Co., Inc.
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In Nov. 1969, sold major portion of its retail fertilizer
assets and business and subsequently completely withdrew
from that business in the U.S.
In early 1971, acquired all stock of Aral Italiana,
Italian subsidiary of Aral AG, a West German concern.
On Nov. 30, 1971, Mobil acquired three Italian firms
known as Pastucol cos., which manufacture and market
polyethylene film products.
In Sept. 1974, acquired majority interest in Marcor
Inc.. At the time, Marcor conducted principal business
through two wholly owned subsidiaries: Montgomery Ward
& Co., Inc. and Container Corp. of America.
Mobil was incorporated in Mar. 1976 in the State of
Delaware with the intent to operate primarily as a hold-
ing company. As a result, Mobil Oil became a wholly
owned subsidiary of Mobil Corporation.
Prior to July 1, 1976, Mobil Oil had a 54% voting in-
terest in Marcor. Pursuant to the Mobil/Marcor merger
effective July 1, 1976, Mobil Oil owned 50.7% and Mobil
Corporation owned 49.3% of Marcor.
In Feb. 1979, acquired W.F. Hall Printing Co. for
approximately $50.5 million in cash.
In July 1979, acquired the oil and gas operations of
General Crude Oil Co. for $792 million.
In Jan. 1980, sold 17.9% interest in Belridge Oil Co.
In Oct. 1980, acquired TransOcean Oil, Inc. for
$715 million.
In 1981, Mobil Oil declared and paid as a dividend to
Mobil its Container preferred stock holding.
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SHELL OIL COMPANY (SHELL)
Present Business
Company is engaged, principally in the United States,
in the exploration for, and development, production, pur-
chase, transportation and marketing of, crude oil and
natural gas, and the purchase, manufacture, transporta-
tion and marketing of oil and chemical products. In
addition, the Company is engaged in exploration of crude
oil and natural gas outside the United States, including
several ventures with companies of the Royal Dutch/Shell
Group. Also, the Company produces and markets coal and
is in various stages of developing certain of its other
coal and geothermal steam reserves, and is investigating
other energy sources such as tar sands and solar energy.
Acquisitions, Divestments, and Other Activities (1967-81)
In Jan. 1974, Shell Canadian Exploration Co. was termina-
ted as a division and all of the assets and liabilities
of such Company were merged into Shell Oil Co.
In late 1974, acquired the assets of National Oil Co.
In July 1977, acquired Seaway Coal Co. of Cadiz, OH for
$65 million.
In Dec. 1977, Co.'s division acquired the polybutylene
business of Witco Chemical Corp. for an undisclosed
amount of cash.
In Dec. 1979, acquired, through a wholly owned subsidi-
ary, Belridge Oil Co., a producer of crude oil and
natural gas from reserves in Kern County,CA, for
$3.65 billion.
79
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (SOCAL)
Present Business
Standard Oil Company of California is a major inter-
national oil company which, through its numerous sub-
sidiaries and affiliates, has activities in more than
90 countries. It engages in worldwide, integrated petro-
leum operations which consist of exploring for and de-
veloping crude oil and natural gas reserves; transport-
ing crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum products by
pipelines, oil tankersjand motor equipment; operating
large refinery complexes for converting crude oil to
finished products; and marketing at wholesale and retail
the hundreds of products derived from petroleum.
In addition, the Company and its affiliates own or
have interests in numerous plants located around the
world which produce a wide range of chemicals and ferti-
lizers for industry, farms, homes, and gardens. The
Company also carries on real estate activities; explores
for geothermal energy sources in the western U.S.; en-
gages in minerals exploration, both domestic and foreign;
and is devoting considerable effort to projects related
to synthetic fuels and alternate energy utilizing sources
such as shale oil, tar sands, and wind.
Activities of the Company and its affiliates are
widely distributed geographically.
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Acquisitions, Divestments, and Other Activities (1967-81)
On Mar. 31, 1967, sold Signal Oil stations to Humble Oil &
Refining Co.
On May 1, 1967, Caltex properties in Europe and its world-
wide marine operations, a joint operation of company and
Texaco Inc., were divided and taken over by two parents.
As a result, company is now conducting refining and
marketing operations on a direct basis in Belgium, Den-
mark, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland, The
Netherlands, and United Kingdom, and on a joint basis in
France, Spain, and Turkey.
In June 1975, Co. and AMAX Inc., announced the sale of
5.9 million common shares, or 20% of AMAX's stock, to
Co. for $333 million in cash and securities.
The transaction was approved by AMAX shareholders. In
addition to the 5.9 million shares purchased from AMAX,
Co. bought another 500,000 AMAX shares in the open market.
STANDARD OIL COMPANY (SOIND)
Present Business
Standard and its consolidated subsidiaries have a
large integrated petroleum and chemical company that con-
ducts operations on a worldwide basis. Its principal
wholly-owned subsidiaries and the businesses in which
they are engaged are:
Amoco Oil Co.: Refining, transporting, and marketing
of petroleum products and sale of fertilizers.
Amoco Production Co.: Exploration, development, and
production of crude oil and natural gas.
Amoco Canada Petroleum Co., Ltd.: Exploration, develop-
ment and production of crude oil and natural gas in
Canada.
Amoco International Oil Co.: Direction of overseas petro-
leum operations.
Amoco Chemicals Corp: Manufacture and sale of chemical
products.
Amoco Minerals Co.: Exploration, extraction, processing,
and marketing of mineral resources.
Acquisitions, Divestments, and Other Activities (1967-81)
In Jan. 1968, Amoco Chemical Corp., subsidiary, acquired
all stock of Avisun Corp. from Sun Oil Co. for $80 million.
Company also acquired Patchogue-Plymouth Co., manufactur-
ers of polypropylene carpet backing.
In early 1972, Company made an exchange offer, which ex-
pired May 31, 1972, to exchange 1.68 shares of common
stock for each Midwest Oil Corp. common share. As of
Dec. 31, 1972 Company had acquired 94.99% interest in
Midwest; remaining interest acquired April 15, 1974.
In Dec. 1978, formed new subsidiary, Amoco Container Co.
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On Sept. 21, 1979, acquired Cyprus Mines Corp. for 5.1
million common shares and $117.2 million cash.
In 1980, acquired Empire Energy Corp. and Emerald Mines
Corp.
On Aug. 7, 1981, Co. sold its 63% interest in Cyprus Min-
ing Corp. to a subsidiary of Hudson's Bay Oil & Gas Co.
for $171 million cash.
In 1981, acquired Harbert Corp. and several small chemi-
cal firms for $272 million cash and common stock.
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THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (SOHIO)
Present Business
The Company and its subsidiaries are engaged in all
branches of the oil industry, namely; exploring, producing,
transporting, refining, and marketing. The Company was
originally a refiner and marketer with entrance into
pipeline transportation and crude production in the late
1930s. Company's marketing activities are largely con-
centrated in the eastern portion of U.S. from Maine
through Virginia and in Ohio and surrounding area. In
addition to marketing the usual oil products such as
gasoline, kerosene, motor oils, industrial lubricants,
asphalt road oil, and fuel oils, the company handles
a general line of automobile tires, batteries, and
other automotive accessories. Manufacturing and market-
ing of chemicals and plastic products and production and
sale of coal, metals, copper, and other minerals are per-
formed by wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Acquisitions, Divestments and Other Activities (1967-81)
In Jan. 1967, Company merged its chemicals and plastics
wholly-owned subsidiaries into Vistron Corp.
In Apr. 1967, acquired Ankney Food Service, Inc., an
industrial catering and vending company of Dayton, OH.
In Aug. 1968, acquired Old Ben Coal Corp.
On Jan. 1, 1970, acquired all outstanding capital stock
of British Petroleum (Holdings) Inc. for 1,000 shares of
Special Stock. BP Oil Corp., major subsidiary of British
Petroleum (Holdings) Inc. has assets which include mar-
keting and refining properties, Alaskan oil and gas leases,
and other interests. Amalgamation of BP Oil Corp. proper-
ties with those of Sohio was effected on Jan. 1, 1970.
In 1971, sold assets of Fleet-Wing Corp. and Fremont Oil
Co. Also sold Loma Products division. Merged BP Pipe
Line Corp. into Sohio Pipe Line Co.
In May 1972, Company's interest in Hospitality Motor Inns
was reduced to 49% through latter's sale of common stock
to public. (Sold entire interest to Helmsley Enterprises,
Inc. in Jan. 1979).
In June 1973, Company sold marketing properties in FL, GA,
NC, and SC plus Port Arthur Refinery to American Petro-
fina, Inc.
In Jan. 1978, acquired BP Alaska, Inc. for cash. (Re-
sponsibility for BP Alaska, Inc. has been assumed by
Sohio Natural Resources).
In Dec. 1979, acquired Webb Resources, Inc. and Newco Ex-
ploration Co.
In Oct. 1980, sold Pro Brush division to subsidiary of
Rexall Drug Co.
In June 1981, merged Kennecott Corp. The Company ac-
quired the outstanding common shares of Kennecott for
$62 per share for a total cost of$1.77 billion.
In Sept. 1981, acquired certain Appalachian coal pro-
perties in Pennsylvania and West Virginia from U.S.
Steel Corp.
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SUN COMPANY, INC. (SUN)
Present Business
Sun Company, Inc. is an energy resources company
with integrated petroleum operations primarily in the
United States and Canada and has interests in mining
and alternate energy. The Company is also engaged in
certain non-energy activities. The company's explora-
tion and production operations consist of natural gas
and natural gas liquids and natural gas liquids mar-
keting operations. Mining operations comprise coal and
oil sands. Coal operations are conducted in the United
States while oil sands operations, which produce a
synthetic crude oil, are conducted in Western Canada.
Alternate energy operations consist principally of
geothermal and oil shale development. Refining and mar-
keting includes the refining of crude oil and its de-
rivatives, the marketing of a full range of refined
petroleum products, and the transportation of crude oil
and refined petroleum products. Such operations are con-
ducted in the United States and Canada. Overseas re-
fining and marketing activities consist principally of
procuring crude oil for United States and Canadian re-
fining operations and resales of purchased oil. Infor-
mation about the Company's business segments and its
operation in different geographic areas is as follows:
Sun operates in the following industry seg-
ments: (1) energy-exploration and produc-
tion; (2) energy mining and alternate energy;
(3) energy-refining and marketing; and (4) non-
energy.
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Acquisitions, Divestments, and Other Activities (1967-81)
On Oct. 25, 1968, merged with Sunray DX.
In Oct. 1969, acquired assets of Waboo Inc., McAlester,
OK., marketer of petroleum gas, for undisclosed terms.
In July 1970, acquired Southern Minerals Corp., Southern
Petroleum Corp., & Southern Pipeline Corp., Corpus Chris-
ti, TX.
Also in July 1970, acquired Nonark Petroleum Co., (St.
Louis), H.F. Nelson, Inc. (Winchester, Va.), Modern
Oil Co. (Raleigh, N.C.), Public Oil Co. (Lex., N.C.)
and Cheap Gasoline Inc. (Lex., N.C.)
In 1970, Co. increased ownership in Great Canadian Oil
Lands Ltd. to 96.1%
In Dec. 1973, Sperry-Sun, Inc., subsidiary, acquired
Reamco, Inc., a Louisiana based maker and marketer of
specialized oil field equipment and services.
In Mar. 1974, sold South Central Oil Co., subsidiary,
to Amtel, Inc.
In early 1974, Company organized a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary, Sun Oil Trading Co., to buy, sell, and exchange
foreign crude oil and products for its own account.
In July, 1974, Calvert Exploration Co. was merged into
Sun Calvert Co., subsidiary.
In 1974, Company formed Sunoco Energy Development Co.,
subsidiary based in Dallas, TX, to develop a competitive
position for Company in coal, oil shale, geothermal
energy, and uranium in the U.S.
Also in 1974, Co. divested itself of Red Barn Chemicals,
Inc., subsidiary.
In 1975, S.J.T., Inc. a joint venture owned 46.6% by
Sun Ventures, Inc. subsidiary, acquired complete owner-
ship of H.P. International, Inc. a Dallas based indus-
trial distribution firm with subsidiaries in Houston,
Dallas, and Fort Worth, TX.
In May 1976, Sun Ventures, Inc., subsidiary, increased
its ownership in Audio-Magnetics Corp. from 29.2% to
83.8%.
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In Aug. 1976, acquired Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., Trotwood, OH.
In May, 1977, Sun Distributors Inc., subsidiary, acquired
Kar Products Inc.
In Jan. 1978, Co., through a newly formed wholly-owned
subsidiary, purchased in private transaction approxi-
mately 34% of common stock of Becton, Dickinson and Co.
for an aggregate cost of $293 million.
In Mar. 1978, Sun Distributors, Inc., subsidiary, acquired
Atlas Screw & Specialty Co., for $3.6 million.
In Apr. 1978, Co.'s unit, Sun Information Services Co.,
acquired more than 99% of stock ofWeiland Computer Group,
Inc. for undisclosed amount.
In Oct. 1978, Co. subsidiary, Sun Carriers, Inc. ac-
quired Milne Truck Lines, Inc. and its affiliates.
In Feb. 1979, Co.'s Sun Information Services Co., ac-
quired computer division of Metridata Computing, Inc.
for approximately $3 million.
In Oct. 1979, acquired Elk River Resources, Inc. for
5.1 million shares of Co. common stock.
In Dec. 1979, through subsidiary acquired Catallactics
Corp. for cash.
In Jan. 1980, through subsidiary acquired Mr. Zip, Inc.
for cash and notes.
In Aug. 1979, formed Suncor Inc. through the amalgama-
tion of Sun Oil Co., Ltd. and Great Canadian Oil
Sands Ltd.
In Aug. 1979, acquired Carboline Co. for cash and notes.
In June, 1980, Co. through a wholly-owned subsidiary
acquired Viking Oil Ltd.
In late 1980 sold Duncan, OK refinery for $140 million
cash.
In Dec. 1980 Co. acquired the U.S. oil and gas proper-
ties of Seagram Co.'s Texas Pacific Oil Co. for $2.3 bil-
lion.
88
nrX_·11IPW~EN-~r~arrsr~·~31~T*-B~PiCj~PI~
In Apr. 1981 Sun Information Services Co., a subsidiary,
acquired the stock of Metropolitan Computer Center, Inc.
The acquired Company became part of the unit's banking
services division.
On Apr. 21, 1981, sold Sperry-Sun, Inc. to NL Industries,
Inc. for $252 million cash.
In Nov. 1981 sold Corpus Christi, TX refinery and cer-
tain related assets for $265 million in cash.
In Dec. 1981 sold 25% of the outstanding common stock
of Suncor Inc.
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TENNECO INC. (TENN)
Present Business
The major businesses of Tenneco Inc. and its subsidi-
aries are oil exploration and production; processing and
marketing of oil and chemicals; natural gas pipelines;
manufacturing; and life insurance.
Tenneco's other businesses include its fiber, food,
and land businesses. These businesses are engaged in the
manufacture and sale of paperboard, corrugated shipping
containers, folding cartons, molded pulp products and
other packaging products, and agriculture and land man-
agement.
Acquisitions, Divestments, and Other Activites (1967-81)
In Apr. 1967, 10-Foam, Inc., subsidiary, acquired General
Foam Corp.
In Aug 1967, acquired Kern County Land Co.
During 1967, Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., subsidiary of Tenneco
Corp., purchased 84% of Butler Chemicals, Ltd., bringing
total interest held to 96%.
In Dec. 1967, acquired Drott Manufacturing Corp.; Tenneco
Holland, Inc., subsidiary of Tenneco Corp., acquired
Gebr. Broere N.V.
In Jan. 1968, acquired 50% of Genset Corp.
In Sept. 1968, Tenneco Virginia Inc., subsidiary of Tenneco
Corp., acquired Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
In Nov. 1968, acquired Davis Manufacturing Inc.
In Dec. 1968, acquired Mechanex Corp. and the Eastern Cor-
rugated Box Co.
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In Mar. 1969, Tenneco Corp., subsidiary, acquired Motor
Condensator Co. Schloz KG, a German automotive parts
manufacturer.
In July 1969, acquired all outstanding capital stock of
Southeastern Aniline Co., Inc.
In Aug. 1969, acquired Tri-Co. Almonds, Inc. and Tri-Co. Co.
In Nov. 1969, acquired Qualitron Aero, Inc.
In Dec. 1969, through Moorgate Corp., acquired additional
shares of J.I. Case Co. common stock, bringing total
common ownership to 91% and preferred to 89%. In Aug.
1970, acquired balance of outstanding shares. Case now
operated as wholly-owned subsidiary of Tenneco Corp.
In Jan. 1970, acquired 3,060 acres of California farmland
from S.A. Camp Ginning Co.
In Feb. 1970, acquired Heggblade-Marguleas Co.
Also in Feb. 1970, acquired balance of stock of Tennessee
River Pulp and Paper Co. (49%) and the Corrinth and Counce
Railroad Co. (49%) for about $25 million cash. Both com-
panies will continue to operate as subsidiaries of Pack-
aging Corp. of America.
In Oct. 1970, acquired for J.I. Case Co., a majority in-
terest in Losenhausen Maschinenbau AG of Dusseldorf, Germany.
In Dec. 1971, sold 30,000 acres of agricultural row crop
development and undeveloped properties in Kern County,
CA for approximately $15 million.
In Mar. 1972, sold additional 25,000 acres of prime land
in North Kern County, TX for approximately $42 million.
In June 1971, Tenneco International Inc., subsidiary of
Tenneco Corp., purchased convertible loan stock of Al-
bright & Wilson Ltd., which, if converted in full before
Dec. 31, 1971, would increase its overall interest in
Albright & Wilson Ltd. to 50.6% of outstanding ordinary
stock.
In Aug. 1972, acquired David Brown Tractors Ltd. for
approximately $19 million. (Now operated as division of
J.I. Case Co., subsidiary).
In Oct. 1973, completed acquisition of Fritz Lange Metall-
warenfabrik, a West German manufacturer of automotive
exhaust systems.
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In early 1974, formed a new Organic & Polymers division.
In Dec. 1974, Tenneco Oil Co., subsidiary of Tenneco Corp.
acquired La Terre Co., Inc. whose assets consist primarily
of oil and gas interests.
Also in Dec. 1974, AB Starlawerken, a Swedish manufacturer
of automobile exhaust systems, was acquired as an operating
unit of Walker Manufacturing.
Prior to year-end 1974, Tenneco International, Inc. increased
its interest in Albright & Wilson, Ltd. 49.8%. In Aug. 1978,
Co. increased its voting interest in Albright & Wilson, Ltd.
common stock to 50.5%. In Sept. 1978, Co. acquired all the
remaining stock of Albright & Wright, Ltd. for approxi-
mately $232 million.
In Dec. 1975, acquired 95% interest in Harmo Industries, Ltd.
On June 30, 1976, Tenneco International, Inc., subsidiary,
transferred all the shares of its unit, Tenneco, Nether-
lands, Inc., to a subsidiary of British Petroleum Co. Ltd.
In June 1977, Co. acquired remaining 16% interest in Mid-
western Gas Transmission Co.
In June 1977, a subsidiary of Co. acquired 40% interest in
Poclain, S.A., a French construction machinery firm.
In 1977, acquired all outstanding common stock of Monroe
Auto Equipment Co.
In Dec. 1977, acquired remaining 50% interest in Petro-Tex
Chemical Corp. for approximately $35 million, giving Co.
100% ownership.
On Mar. 1, 1978, acquired full ownership of Philadelphia
Life Insurance Co.
In Oct. 1978, Co. sold Caligen Goam Ltd. to British Vita
Ltd. for approximately $4 million.
On May 2, 1980, acquired Southwestern Life Corp.
On Apr. 24, 1981, merged Houston Oil and Minerals Corp.
TEXACO INC. (TEX)
Present Business
Texaco Inc., together with subsidiary and nonsubsidiary
companies (those companies owned 50% or less), is engaged
in the worldwide exploration for, and production, trans-
portation, refining,and marketing of, crude oil and its
products, including petrochemicals.
Acguisitiions, Divestments, and Other Activities (1967-81)
In 1966 and 1967, acquired approximately 97% of capital stock
of Deutsche Texaco A.G. In Jan. 1967, interest was increased
to 97.3%. In Jan. 1969, Deutsche Erdol A.G. and subsidiary
transferred coal mining operations and related assets,
liabilities and reserves to Ruhrkole A.G. (a company in
which no interest is held), organized to consolidate
operations of coal companies in Germany.
In Aug. 1971, acquired a two-thirds interest in Refineria
Panama, S.A., which operates a 40,000 bbl. a day refinery
at Los Minas Bay in Republic of Panama. During 1973,
increased equity to 100%. Expansion to 100,000 bbl. a
day completed in 1974.
In Aug. 1972, acquired 20% interest in Skandinaviska
Raffinaderi Aktiebolaget Scanraff, a Swedish Corp. formed
for purpose of building and operating a petroleum re-
finery.
In Jan. 1977, Texaco North Sea Norway A/S, subsidiary, ac-
quired a 35% interest in two oil exploration blocks cover-
ing 131,000 acres in Norwegian sector of North Sea for
undisclosed terms.
In Nov. 1979, Co. sold its interest in Elf France to Societe
Nationale Elf Aquitaine, France.
In Nov. 1979, an agreement was announced to divide the
assets and business, wherein Texaco will acquire full
ownership of Texas U.S. Chemical, which in turn will retain
its half interest in a butadiene manufacturing plant and
divest its interest in a polymer plant.
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In Jan. 1980, Co. announced that it received payment of
approximately $623 million in exchange for its 17% capital
stock interest in Belridge Oil Co. Co. received payment
in accordance with the arrangement under which Shell Oil
Co. acquired Belridge.
In June 1980, Co. sold a 14% stock interest in Seanraff
refinery to Svenska Petroleum AB.
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UNION OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (UNION)
Present Business
Company is engaged principally in petroleum, chemi-
cal, metaland geothermal operations. Petroleum involves
exploration, production, transportation, and sale of crude
oil and natural gas, and the manufacture, transportation,
and marketing of petroleum products. Chemicals involves
the manufacture, purchase, transportation, and marketing
of chemicals for industrial and agricultural uses. Metals
primarily involves exploration, production, and market-
ing of molybdenum, columbium, and rare earths. Geo-
thermal involves the exploration, production, and sale
of geothermal resources. Other operations include the
exploration,production,and sale of uranium; the develop-
ment of oil shale resources; and real estate development
sales.
The manufacturing, purchase, transportation, and
sale of chemicals derived from petroleum and natural gas
are conducted by company's chemical division. Principal
products are ammonia, urea, dry ice, liquid carbon diox-
ide, ammonium phosphate, liquefied petroleum gas, in-
dustrial chemicals and carbons, fertilizers, farm chemi-
cal products, solvents, and polymer emulsions.
Products are distributed through owned, leased, and
independent bulk stations, and directly from refineries.
Retail distribution is effected through owned, leased,
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and independent outlets.
Certain company products, principally lubricating
oils, greases, and waxes are sold nationally and in many
foreign countries on a limited basis.
Acquisitions, Divestments, and Other Activities (1967-81)
In Mar. 1967, acquired through a subsidiary, Southern Paci-
fic Milling Co. for about $6 million cash.
In 1969, acquired 26% interest in Wolverine Pipe Line Co.,
and a partner's half-interest in American Mineral Spirits
Co., Western, now part of the Union Chemicals Division.
Also in 1969, sold investments in Great Northern Oil Co.
and Minnesota Pipeline Co.
In Apr. 1976, Union Oil Co. of Canada Ltd. (86% owned)
sold refining and marketing facilities to Husky Oil Ltd.
for $38 million.
In July 1977, Molycorp, Inc. was merged into Co. Moly-
corp also owned approximately 49% of Kawecki Berylco In-
dustries, Inc. (sold Apr. 1978) and a 33% interest in Com-
panhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineracao, the world's
largest producer of columbium from its mine in Brazil.
In 1980, Molycorp increased its equity in Companhia Brasi-
leira de Metalurgia to 47%.
In Dec. 1977, Molycorp entered into an agreement which
terminated any interest Kennecott Copper Corp. had
in Molycorp's Questa, New Mexico, molybdenum property.
In Feb. 1978, all of assets and operations of Collier
Carbon and Chemical Corporation, previously a wholly-
owned subsidiary, and Union's former Amsco Division were
combined into a new Union Chemicals Division.
In Dec. 1978, acquired all assets of Silver Bell Indus-
tries, Inc.
In Dec. 1978, acquired Mancos Corp.
In June 1979, all of Company's energy mining operations
(including Minerals Exploration Company) were consolidated
into the new Union Energy Mining Division.
In Nov. 1980, Co. sold its Unicracking-HDS petroleum refin-
ery process technology to Chinese Petroleum Corp. of
Taiwan.
In May 1981, sold its 9.5% interest in Magma Power Co. to
Natomas Co. for $41 million.
In July 1981, completed purchase of all outstanding
shares of Union Oil Co. of Canada Ltd. at $65 per share.
In July 1981, Co. signed two joint venture agreements to
explore for and develop geothermal energy resources on
the island of Hokkaido in northern Japan.
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Appendix B
Company Sales and Other Operating Revenues
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Appendix E
Company Annual Rankings According to All Equity Excess Returns
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